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The old saying has it that in presidential elections "as
goes Maine, so goes the nation." While this statement may
have once been valid, over the last forty years the bell-
wether nature of the state of Maine has been open to serious
challenge. In fact, in the last ten presidential elections
Maine has cast its electoral vote for the losing candidate
six times. The question of which state most closely follows
national patterns in presidential elections is an interesting
one, however, especially in this presidential year. If one
could find a state in which national presidential returns
were closely mirrored over a period of years — and if one
had some idea why this state-national parallelism existed —
that state's returns would provide not only a clue to the
national outcome, but also some reasons for it.
One of the likeliest candidates for the "microcosm"
state in presidential elections is the state of Illinois. In the
twentieth century, Illinois has cast its electoral votes for
the winning candidate in every presidential election except
1916, when the Republican, Charles Evans Hughes, won
the state's electoral votes over the Democrat, Woodrow
Wilson. Illinois's popular vote percentages have also
closely paralleled those at the national level during the
twentieth century. In fact, since 1928 percentages won by
the various presidential candidates in the state have never
been more than five percentage points from the corre-
sponding national figures; in some elections, the two
figures have been almost identical (see Figure 1 and
Table 1). 1
Even during the first quarter of the twentieth century,
when popular vote figures in Illinois were somewhat biased
toward Republican presidential candidates, the presi-
dential figures never differed by as much as 8 percentage
points from the national figures. The average difference
for this period was 5.6 percent. Indeed, looking back into
the nineteenth century, Illinois's popular presidential
election returns have closely paralleled national figures
since the emotion-laden election of 1860, just before the
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Civil War. The mean Democratic percentage for Illinois
for the entire period from 1870 to 1972 differs from the
national mean by only 2.1 percentage points.
The means for presidential elections for the periods
1876-92, 1900-24, and 1940-60, appearing in Table 1,
will give the reader an impression of relative partisan
strength during these time spans. Most political scholars
view these three periods as eras of partisan stability in
American history. The other time periods are eras of
partisan instability. The period from 1860-72 involved the
Civil War and Reconstruction. The 1896 election and the
1928-36 elections took place in times of partisan realign-
ment, the former bringing the Republicans to national
dominance and the latter making the Democrats the
national power. Finally, the post-1 960 era has been a period
of partisan instability, not clearly explained as yet
Given that presidential election results in the state have
so closely resembled those at the national level for so
long, it certainly appears that Illinois is a political micro-
cosm of the nation — if only in this very limited sense. One
must then ask the more fundamental question of why this
is the case. Could it be that the underlying social and
economic base of Illinois is an almost perfect miniature
of the nation which leads it naturally to mirror the nation
in presidential voting?
Such a view gains support from a recent study which
concludes that, in recent years at least, the Illinois economy
has been almost a duplicate of the national economy. 2
But the inquiry must be broadened. To proceed along these
lines, one must show not only that Illinois's economy has
duplicated that of the United States since at least the turn
of the century (which apparently it has), but also that the
state has mirrored the nation on such politically relevant
social characteristics as religion, country of ancestry,
and class status over this same period. As it turns out.
this is only partially true. Rather, as will be shown, Illinois
has achieved its status as a bellwether state not by exactly
mirroring the underlying social and economic base of
the nation, but by achieving the proper balance of these
characteristics — and of other structural characteristics
such as electoral laws and party organizational strength —
that have allowed the state to reflect national patterns
during different historical epochs.
Illinois is, of course, one of the largest states in the
2 See Robert N Schoeplein with Hugh T. Connelly, The Illinois Economy:
A Microcosm of the United States? (Urbana: Institute of Government and
Public Affairs. University of Illinois. 1975). and Robert N Schoeplein,
"Illinois and the United States Some Economic Parallels," Illinois Govern-
ment Research no 42 (March 1976).
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Definitions from Richard Jensen, The Winning of the Midwest (Chi-
cago University of Chicago Press, 1971), and V O Key, Jr., American
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appeal cut across sectional and ethnoreligious lines.
Roosevelt would have been expected to have an especially
strong impact on a state such as Illinois, with its highly
urbanized working-class population compared to the
nation as a whole, and, as Table 1 indicates, the Democrats
did increase their strength greatly in the state during and
after the 1930s
A closer look at the Illinois data indicates the nature of
Roosevelt's appeal. In 1928, Smith carried only one of the
urban counties (St. Clair), while in 1936 Roosevelt suc-
ceeded in carrying them all In fact, despite the increased
statewide Democratic vote between 1932 and 1936, only
19 of III inois's 102 counties showed an increase in the
percentage of Democratic votes between those two years.
Virtually all the counties that gained Democratic votes
between 1932 and 1936 were in or adjacent to the most
urbanized counties in the state. The only exceptions to
this urban movement to the Democrats were St. Clair
County (East St. Louis), which remained virtually stationary
after becoming the most Democratic county in the state,
and Sangamon County, home of the Illinois state capital,
with a relatively small industrial base. (The 1929 Census
of Manufactures shows Sangamon County as the least
industrialized among the urbanized counties in Illinois )
Franklin Roosevelt did have some followers in rural
areas where organized labor was strong. An indication of
this is seen in the voting figures from Franklin County,
where the United Mine Workers has been an important
force. This county showed a Democratic increase after
the 1930s; since then it has been one of the most con-
sistently Democratic counties of the state (see Table 2).
It appears, then, that after the 1 930s social class became
the dominant theme of American politics. One would
expect the working-class-based Democratic Party to be
favored over the more middle-class-based Republican
Party in lllinois's highly urban and industrialized setting.
This has not been the case. The Democrats did gain in
Illinois as a result of the New Deal, but the Republicans
have continued to hold a slight advantage in presidential
politics in Illinois as compared to the nation — at least
until the very recent past. Other forces besides the
basic working class-middle class cleavage have ob-
viously been at work
Other Factors
The older sectional and ethnoreligious factors certainly
still have an effect on lllinois's presidential politics. Rural
northern Illinois has continued to be a Republican bastion,
while the Democrats have seen their already tenuous foot-
hold in southern Illinois gradually slip away as they have
directed their appeals at urban working populations whose
religious, ethnic, and racial composition is quite different
from the old-stock white Protestant populations of southern
Illinois. Most of lllinois's black population is concentrated
in the Chicago and East St. Louis areas, and this tends to
increase the social distinctiveness of these urban Demo-
cratic strongholds from the rest of the state. This helps
to explain the continuing Republican strength in downstate
urban as well as rural areas.
Some other socioeconomic factors have probably also
had some effect on the nature of Illinois presidential politics.
The state's population has had a somewhat higher median
age level than does the nation as a whole. Since older
populations have tended to favor the Republicans, this
may have helped the party in the state. The most recent
census, however, shows age distribution in Illinois to be
virtually identical with that in the nation, lllinois's black
population is also now at virtually the same percentage
as the national figures, reducing the earlier Republican
advantage. On the other hand, the median family income
in Illinois has remained higher than that of the nation —
a factor that might favor the Republican Party, since tradi-
tionally more prosperous populations have tended to
support it.
To understand Illinois presidential politics, however,
one must go beyond the socioeconomic makeup of the
state. As pointed out earlier, for example, Pennsylvania's
Republican strength in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries must be at least partially attributed to
the organizational abilities of its Republican leaders.
The disfranchisement of blacks in the South in the late
nineteenth century was certainly a factor in the weakening
of the Republican Party in that region, overriding underlying
socioeconomic forces. Such structural factors certainly
do influence the political makeup of a state; the question
is one of their relative importance in affecting political
events. Whatever their degree of importance, there can
be little doubt that the structures a state sets up for
organizing and expressing the vote can have a profound
effect on that vote.
In the case of Illinois, both major presidential parties
have maintained strong organizations throughout the
twentieth century; signs of weakness have appeared only
immigrant status were very important in determining elec-
toral outcomes; this was particularly true in the election of
1896. The factors that influenced the outcome of this
election continued to affect American politics until the late
1920s, and thus it is clear that religion and immigrant status
were quite important during the first thirty years of the
twentieth century Even since then, giv.en the stability of
partisan attachments in many areas, one could expect these
factors to continue to affect the political system.
Outside the South prior to 1896, old-stock American
and some older immigrant groups who were members of
pietistic Protestant faiths (such as Methodist, Baptist,
and Congregationalist) tended to line up with the Repub-
lican Party against the Catholics and nonpietistic Prot-
estants (such as German Lutherans). Generally of immigrant
stock, Catholics and nonpietistic Protestants tended to side
with the Democrats. These latter groups resided primarily in
the urban centers of the North, although there were some
rural pockets of German Catholic and German Lutheran
strength in parts of the Midwest. The effect of the rural,
nativist appeal of Democrat William Jennings Bryan, a
pietistic Protestant, in the 1896 presidential campaign was
to alienate a large share of the urban, newer immigrant
populations from the Democratic Party. Bryan's campaign
had little effect on the Republican leanings of the northern
pietistic Protestants. Ironically, his great appeal in the South
left the country more sectionally divided in terms of voting
patterns after 1 896 than it had been before. The Democratic
Party took on a distinctly southern orientation, which lasted
into the late 1920s, while the Republican Party was strength-
ened in the industrialized North and, therefore, in the nation
as a whole.
During the twentieth century Illinois has contained rela-
tively higher proportions of urban, Catholic, and foreign-
stock populations than has the United States at large.
Since these groups were those most alienated by the nature
of the Democratic Party after 1896, one might expect
that Illinois would be somewhat more Republican relative
to the rest of the country between 1896 and 1928 (when the
Democrats nominated a Catholic of immigrant stock,
Alfred E. Smith) than it was before the turn of the century.
As shown in Table 1, Illinois did become more Republican
after the turn of the twentieth century than it had been before;
it also became somewhat more Republican relative to the
country as a whole during the first quarter of the century.
Further, a closer look at the data lends some support to
the notion that the drop in Democratic voting was partic-
ularly severe in areas of Catholic immigrant-stock con-
centration such as rural Clinton County and urban Cook,
Rock Island, and Peoria counties. (Compare the 1876-92
mean Democratic vote with the 1900-24 mean in Table 2 )
It would appear, then, that in Illinois the desertion of the
Democratic Party by peoples of Catholic and immigrant-
stock background added to the party's woes in the early
twentieth century.
In 1928 the Democrats made a strong effort to bring
these Catholic, foreign-stock populations back into the
party by running one of their coreligionists, Alfred E.
Smith of New York, for president. A large majority of these
populations were located among the urban working class.
Some have argued that the New Deal coalition of Franklin
D. Roosevelt had its roots in the 1928 presidential election.
Recently, others have argued that the 1928 election should
probably be viewed as a phenomenon separate from the
New Deal realignment.
The Illinois data lend some support to this more recent
argument. In urban Macon County, with its predominantly
Protestant, old-stock working population, Democratic
percentages fell significantly from those generally achieved
in the first quarter of the twentieth century, while in rural
Clinton County, with a heavily Catholic population, there
was a significant jump in Democratic votes in presidential
elections (see Table 2). Thus it appears that rather than
becoming the beneficiary of a massive working-class move-
ment, in 1928 the Democratic party gained Catholic,
foreign-stock votes, while losing Protestant working-class
votes.
The New Deal and Class Voting
With the coming of the Great Depression in 1929 and the
emergence of Roosevelt's New Deal between 1932 and
1936, the older sectional and ethnoreligious cleavages
took a back seat to the new working class-middle class
cleavage that has since come to characterize American
politics. However, the older patterns did not die. One can
still see the Republican-Democratic split among rural
northern and southern populations, and Catholics and
persons of more recent foreign ancestry still show a
Democratic bias compared to more Protestant, old-stock
Americans. Since the 1930s, however, the issue of class
seems to have become more salient than the older issues.
Roosevelt's appeal after 1932 was directed primarily
at working-class populations that tended to be concen-
trated in large urban areas. Of course, his supporters
included a large part of the Catholic and foreign-stock
populations that had been drawn to Smith, but his broad
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Virginia. Sentiment for the Confederacy was much less
prevalent in these states than in the states of the Deep
South; each of them contained areas of traditional Re-
publican strength. Given this background, it is not sur-
prising that during the first quarter of the twentieth century,
when Civil War political divisions were still very much a
part of American politics, southern Illinois was politically
competitive in presidential elections, while northern Illinois
remained a Republican stronghold.
Regional patterns of the presidential vote during the
height of the New Deal period, from 1940 to 1960, illustrate
the continuing political division between northern and
southern Illinois. This division continued in a more subdued
form until 1972, at least in rural areas. In 1964 the most
strongly Democratic counties, with the notable exceptions
of urban Cook (Chicago) and Rock Island (Rock Island-
Moline) counties, were generally found in southern Illinois,
while nearly all the Republican counties were found in the
northern part of the state. In 1968 the southern candidate,
George Wallace, drew over 10 percent of the vote in twenty-
seven Illinois counties. All but one of these counties
were areas of original southern settlement.
In 1972, the regional cast of voting in Illinois (as in the
nation) was largely washed away with the overwhelming
defeat of the Democrat, George McGovern, in Richard
Nixon's landslide. Although most of the twenty-six counties
in which McGovern received at least 40 percent of the
vote were found in southern Illinois (he carried only
Jackson County), the counties he lost by the smallest
margins were generally either urban in character or were
coal-mining areas of some union strength, such as Franklin
County in southern Illinois.
While much of northern Illinois has been a Republican
bastion during the twentieth century, southern Illinois has
not been the Democratic bastion that the American South
has been. This fact serves to explain why the state as a
whole had a Republican bias prior to the New Deal It
also explains why rural portions of the state have retained
this bias.
Ethnoreligious Factors
Other socioeconomic factors besides region are also im-
portant in determining voting behavior. As has been docu-
mented, in the late nineteenth century religion and
quite recently. Such organizational strength is found in
the low degree of split-ticket voting that has characterized
the state's elections. Organizational strength is also evident
in the state's closed primary system, which made it
extremely difficult to cross party lines until 1972. The
state's strong .party organizations are also evident in the
use of the party column ballot, which facilitates straight-
ticket voting and helps keep partisans in line. These
structures both reflect strong major party organizations
and encourage their continuation. The relatively high
turnout in Illinois elections compared to the nation also
indicates the ability of the party organizations to turn out
their followers.
A closer look at the party organizations in Illinois is
instructive. The Democratic organization has been very
powerful in Chicago and East St. Louis, but quite weak
downstate. On the other hand, Republicans, while lacking
the centralized party structure that has characterized the
Democratic organization, have maintained stronger party
organization than the Democrats downstate and have had
a strong organization in the suburban areas of Cook County
as well. Here is another reason why the Democrats have
been weaker in Illinois presidential voting than one might
expect from socioeconomic data. They have not maintained
a downstate organization strong enough to pull sufficient
numbers of potential Democratic voters to the polls —
perhaps a factor in the inability of the Democrats to maintain
their majorities in downstate urban areas after 1936
Another structural factor probably helped the Repub-
licans maintain their relative strength until at least the mid-
1960s. That was the failure of the state legislature to re-
apportion legislative and congressional seats on the basis
of population, resulting in more legislative and congressional
strength for Republican-leaning rural areas of the state
than their populations would otherwise allow them. In
terms of presidential politics, there were relatively more
Republican than Democratic officeholders to mobilize the
party faithful on election day. Of course, the Supreme Court
decisions of the 1960s requiring population-based appor-
tionment have changed this situation.
In the early 1970s, some weakening of both parties'
organizations has been evident, in Illinois as in the nation.
In 1972 Republican candidates for president and U.S.
senator carried the state by lopsided margins, while
Democrats captured the governor's chair and the secretary
of state's office. In Cook County, a Republican wrested
control of the state's attorney's office from the Democrats.
In the 1976 Democratic presidential primary, Jimmy Carter
won despite the party organization's efforts to elect an
uncommitted slate, and a black Democratic antiorgani-
zation candidate won renomination to Congress from
Chicago.
Nevertheless, the party organizations in Illinois still
appear to be quite powerful. Split-ticket voting appears
to occur less frequently in Illinois than in many other
states, and turnout still appears to be somewhat above the
national average. The state Democratic organization
showed a good deal of muscle in the 1976 primary, when
it succeeded in deposing the antiorganization incumbent
Democratic governor. Given this high degree of organi-
zational strength, it appears unwise for either a Democratic
or a Republican presidential candidate to take the state
for granted.
The addition of the eighteen-year-old vote is a recent
structural change that could also influence Illinois
politics. Because age distribution in the state is very
much like that in the nation, state and national voting
returns should be affected in about the same way by this
factor. Certainly the bonanza which the McGovern forces
expected in 1972 by the addition of this group did not ma-
terialize, but there do appear to be localized effects in
areas where the eighteen-year-old vote has been mobilized
effectively. For example, three of McGovern's strongest
counties in Illinois were areas with large college student
populations. He succeeded in carrying Jackson County
(Southern Illinois University) and drew better than would
have been expected in normally Republican Champaign
County (University of Illinois) and DeKalb County (Northern
Illinois University).
Conclusion
It appears that while lllinois's socioeconomic base gives
the Democrats an edge in presidential voting, generally
the Republicans have been able to more effectively
mobilize their potential following in the state. This has
made Illinois quite competitive in presidential elections,
and it has closely mirrored the presidential voting patterns
of the nation. Where changes presently occurring in state
and national politics will lead is open to speculation.
Some say that the parties are decomposing as viable
political organizations. Others feel that a somewhat changed
New Deal cleavage will again emerge. Still others foresee
a period of instability until the parties find new cleavages
that are relevant to the present political period. All these
changes will lead to a different kind of presidential politics.
With these changes, lllinois's presidential voting patterns
may diverge from those of the nation. For now, the state
remains a national electoral microcosm
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